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third-degree price-discrimination setting by introducing differentiated costs. 
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reduce the production of the more costly goods, thereby decreasing average 
cost and increasing welfare. Indeed, monopolistic price differentiation can 
improve welfare and also aggregate consumer surplus even if, as in the 
benchmark linear case, total output does not increase. Accordingly, the 
welfare criterion based on total output fails and should be replaced by the 
computation of well-defined price indexes. These results possibly pave the 
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I. Introduction 
It is well known that imposing uniform pricing on a monopolist instead of allowing third-
degree price discrimination has ambiguous welfare implications. However, Schmalensee (1981), 
Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990) proved that, if (marginal) costs are common, a necessary 
condition for monopolistic third-degree price discrimination to raise aggregate welfare is that total 
output increases under discriminatory pricing. Moreover, in the benchmark case of linear demand 
and cost functions, total output does not change if the markets served by the monopolist are the 
same both under uniform and differentiated pricing:1 see Schmalensee (1981) and Tirole (1988: p. 
139). Since the linear setting is usually adopted because it allows an explicit computation of the 
results and provides a first-order approximation to the general case, the literature on the welfare 
effect of allowing monopolistic price differentiation tends to be rather pessimistic:2 see e.g. 
Schmalensee (1981: p. 246) and Varian (1989: pp. 622-623). 
In this paper we reconsider the case for monopolistic uniform pricing by departing from the 
standard set-up, which assumes that there is a common cost of serving different markets. 
Accordingly, we are not really concerned with (third-degree) price discrimination as narrowly 
defined, since this would require that the same commodity be sold at different prices to different 
consumers: see e.g. Phlips (1981: p. 5). Nevertheless, we think our setting interesting for several 
reasons. First, the standard set up with equal marginal costs is a textbook idealization with little 
empirical content. For example, what guarantees that the marginal cost of serving geographically 
distant markets is the same? Second, perhaps the most appealing definition of price discrimination 
(attributed to George Stigler, 1987), which says that a firm price discriminates when the ratio in 
prices is different from the ratio in marginal costs for two “similar” (possibly identical) goods 
offered by the firm (see e.g. Varian, 1989: p. 598 and Stole, 2003: pp. 1-2), encompasses the case of 
different marginal costs (and so do other standard definitions: see e.g. Tirole, 1988: pp. 133-4 and 
Clerides, 2004). But since they are difficult to verify, it seems clear that, as a policy prescription, 
the use of uniform pricing should be tested against the possibility of unaccounted marginal cost 
differences. Moreover, in our second-best setting even the no-price-discrimination condition à la 
Stigler does not need to be optimal:3 see below. 
Third, while we should perhaps refer to them as examples of price discrimination (once the 
latter is properly defined: see e.g. the comments in Tirole, 1988: p. 133), there are sectors with 
                                                
1
 For the sake of simplicity, we make this assumption throughout this paper. Notice that in fact price differentiation may 
lead to a Pareto improvement if it causes some market to open: see e.g. Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985) and Tirole 
(1988: pp. 137-9). 
2
 This comment only applies to the case of an otherwise unregulated monopoly: see e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (1991). 
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acknowledged differentiated marginal costs, such as the mail or telephone ones, in which uniform 
rates are imposed by public regulation (avoiding, for example, tariff discrimination between rural 
and urban areas), sometimes on a political basis invoking “horizontal equity” (this is the case, for 
instance, of the Italian residential electricity sector). In these cases, uniform pricing entails cross-
subsidies whose welfare consequences have not yet been entirely understood. Fourth, the use of a 
uniform price may serve as a (potentially anticompetitive) strategic practice not to reveal the 
underlying cost structure. While this aspect is not considered here, the related additional social costs 
should in principle be weighed against the other welfare consequences of avoiding price 
differentiation, which are the subject of this paper. Finally, even if the monopolistic results we are 
concerned with do not necessary apply to other imperfectly competitive markets, in the literature it 
is sometimes suggested that they hold more generally (see e.g. the references given in Galera, 2003, 
p. 3). But the assumption of a common marginal cost would seem definitely too strong in the case 
of different firms.4 
Not surprisingly, it turns out that in our enlarged setting the condition of an increase in output 
is no longer necessary to achieve an improvement in welfare through price discrimination. In 
particular, we are able to find many cases in which monopolistic price differentiation increases total 
welfare and aggregate consumer surplus even if, as in the benchmark linear case, total output does 
not increase. This happens if demands are close enough, as is to some extent intuitive, and also in 
some cases in which there is no systematic relation across markets between the demand and the cost 
structures (in general, a reasonable assumption). The intuition is straightforward: the economic 
rationale for imposing uniform pricing in the standard setting rests on the result that a given quantity 
of the same good should be distributed according to a common price (a result which is implied by 
the optimality of marginal cost pricing). But with different marginal costs no general principle can 
be invoked to support uniform pricing (goods are economically different and first-best optimality 
would rather call for the weaker condition of having the prices ratios equal to the marginal cost 
ratios),5 which has no special properties. 
Indeed, the socially efficient production of a given total amount of output (an unusual second-
best problem if goods are not identical) would require that the differences between prices and the 
relative marginal costs be equal across markets. This price structure, which will never be achieved 
                                                                                                                                                            
3
 Indeed, our results provide some theoretical foundations to an alternative price-discrimination definition based on 
price-cost margins: see Clerides (2004) for the empirical relevance of the distinction among different formulations. 
4
 After the first version of this paper was written in 2003, we had the opportunity of reading the papers by Galera (2003) 
and Aguirre (2004), which show by the way of examples that even with linear demands price discrimination can be 
welfare improving if there is more than one firm. We believe that our results, which apply to the monopolistic case, 
nicely complement (and somehow generalize) the point made by those papers. 
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by uniform pricing if marginal costs are different (nor by imposing a no-price-discrimination 
condition à la Stigler), to some extent is more similar6 to the one that would be chosen by an 
unregulated monopolist (a special case of Ramsey pricing, as is well known). In fact, in order to 
maximize his profit, a monopolist could use the alleged price authority to increase the price of the 
more costly goods, thereby decreasing average total cost and also increasing welfare. Indeed, he 
actually does that if the demand elasticities are not “perversely” correlated with the unit costs (this 
should be the case if demands are “close enough”). Some part of the cost reduction so achieved 
could then be “passed” trough prices to the consumers but, of course, the monopolist would also try 
to use his pricing flexibility to extract more surplus from them. Notice that this might give rise to a 
second-best conflict between social welfare and consumer surplus concerns. In general, welfare 
effects unfortunately maintain their ambiguity (as should be expected): however, we show that the 
welfare criterion based on total output fails in general and argue that it should be replaced by the 
computation of well-defined price indexes. Our results also suggest that price differentiation by an 
unregulated monopolist should perhaps be considered more optimistically. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section II the model by Schmalensee (1981) is 
generalized to the case of different (constant) marginal costs, and the results by Varian (1985) are 
applied to it. Section III contains the main point made by this paper: by discussing the special case 
of equal demand elasticities, we show that price discrimination by a monopolist can be welfare and 
(aggregate) consumer surplus improving even if it does not increase total output. We also use the 
model by Schmalensee (1981) to discuss the case of monopolistic “piecemeal” price discrimination. 
Several results are gathered together in Proposition 1. Section IV focuses on the case of linear 
demands, and deals with the use of price indexes to check conditions for welfare improvements and 
the role of cost and demand variability. Results are gathered in Proposition 2. Section V discusses 
our results and concludes. More technical derivations are confined to the Appendixes. 
 
II. The model 
We refer to the model in Schmalensee (1981), which can be seen as a special case of Varian 
(1985). In particular, a monopolist is selling in N distinguishable markets. Let qi(pi) be the demand 
function in market i (i = 1, …, N), where pi is the price charged by the monopolist and qi the 
quantity he sells. It is assumed that the relevant cost function is given by C(q) = c’q = Σiciqi, where 
                                                                                                                                                            
5
 Notice that this is the condition underlying the broad definition of price discrimination due to Stigler and quoted 
above. Also notice that the unregulated monopolist would use this first-best price structure if demand elasticities were 
equal across markets. 
6
 Phlips (1981: pp. 3-4) commented negatively on this similarity, but by referring to the narrowly defined case of a 
unique, common marginal cost. 
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q’ = [q1,q2,…,qN] is the vector7 of the monopolist’s output quantities, ci indicates the constant unit 
cost of output qi and c’ = [c1,c2,…,cN]. We generalize Schmalensee’s (1981) setting by assuming 
that ci is possibly different from cj, i  j, i,j = 1, …, N. The net profit generated in market i can then 
be written pii(pi) = (pi - ci)qi(pi): following most of the literature,8 it is assumed that the pii(pi) are 
smooth, strictly concave functions. The total profit function is thus given by Π(p) = (p - c)’q(p) = 
Σipii(pi), where p’ = [p1,p2,…,pN] is the vector of prices that the monopolist charges. It is also 
assumed that consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Thus, since there are no income and 
distributional effects, we can think in terms of a representative consumer with indirect utility 
function V(p) = v(p) + y0, where y0 is the total endowment of the numeraire (the Marshallian 
composite commodity), who consumes all the goods produced by the monopolist. By quasi-
linearity, v(⋅) is convex and the demand system faced by the monopolist is given by q(p) = - Dpv(p), 
where Dxf(x) is the gradient of f(⋅). Aggregate (social) welfare (the Marshallian indicator) can then 
be written as W(p) = Π(p) + v(p). 
Clearly, the unregulated monopolist would adopt a price vector p* uniquely characterized by 
the FOCs DpΠ(p*) = 0, where 0 is the relevant null vector; i.e., i = 1, …, N: 
 0)()(')()(' **** =+−= iiiiiiii pqpqcpppi , (1) 
which is just the familiar condition of marginal revenue and marginal cost equality in each market. 
On the contrary, if the monopolist is forced to use a uniform price he would charge all buyers p*, 
which is uniquely defined by:  
 0)]()(')[()('
1
***
1
*
=+−=
==
N
i
iii
N
i
i pqpqcpppi . (2) 
It is standard to adopt Joan Robinson’s terminology and to call a market i “strong” if pi* > p*: 
conventionally, we write that in such a case i ∈ S. Accordingly, a market i is “weak” if pi* < p* (and 
thus i ∈ W) and “intermediate” if pi* = p* (and thus i ∈ I). Schmalensee (1981: pp. 243-4) noted that 
the removal of the uniform pricing constraint can be usefully characterized as follows. Consider the 
problem of maximizing Π(p) under the linear constraint: 
 tppp i
N
i
i ≤−
=
)()(' *
1
*pi , (3) 
                                                
7
 Bold characters are used to indicate vectors; conventionally, x is a column vector and x’ indicates its transpose (a row 
vector). 
8
 Without concavity of the profit (of the demand) functions, price discrimination might even move all prices in the same 
direction: see Nahata et alii (1990). 
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where t is some nonnegative real number. The solution p(t) to such a problem is uniquely defined 
by the FOCs DpΠ(p(t)) = λ(t)DpΠ(p*ι), where ι is the relevant unit vector and λ(t) is the 
nonnegative relevant Lagrangean multiplier (it measures the marginal increase in profit due to a 
marginal increase in t: i.e., λ(t) = dΠ(p(t))/dt = Σipii’(pi(t))pi’(t)). 
The price system p(t) has a number of properties:9 in particular, p(0) = p*ι and λ(0) = 1 (this 
value depends on the normalization of the price differences implicit in (3)), and there exits a finite t 
≥ 0 such that p(t) = p* and λ(t) = 0 for all t   t. Moreover, λ’(t) < 0 and sign{pi’(t)} = 
sign{pii’(pi(t))} = sign{pii’(p*)} for all t < t, i =1, …, N. Thus, i ∈ S (i ∈ W) only if pii’(p*) > 0 
(pii’(p*) < 0) and, unless all markets are intermediate (in which case the imposition of uniform 
pricing would have no effect at all), the removal of the uniform pricing constraint monotonically 
increases some prices and decreases others. Analogously, let us introduce the “virtual” unit cost of 
market i at t, ci(t), uniquely characterized by the condition: 
 
0))(())(('))()(( ≡+− tpqtpqtctp iiiiii . (4) 
Notice that ci(t) is obviously equal to market i’s marginal revenue at qi(pi(t)): i.e., pii’(pi(t)) = (ci(t) - 
ci)qi’(pi(t)). Clearly, i ∈ S (i ∈ W) if and only if ci > ci(t) (ci < ci(t)), for t < t (ci(t) = ci), i = 1, ..., N. 
This says that price rises (decreases) are “naturally” associated to high (low) marginal costs and low 
(high) marginal revenue at t. Finally, notice that ι‘DpΠ(p(t)) = Σipii’(pi(t)) = 0 for all t (a sort of 
“average” equality of marginal revenues and marginal costs applies to all t), and thus, by 
differentiation: 
 0)('))](("))(())(('2[)('))(("
11
=−+=
==
tptpqctptpqtptp i
N
i
iiiiiii
N
i
iipi  (5) 
(Schmalensee, 1981: p. 244, provides a graphical analysis for the case with N = 2 and c1 = c2; see 
below our Figure 3). 
Very generally, Varian (1985) established the following welfare bounds for any change in 
(linear) prices from p0 to p1 (the result follows from the convexity of v(⋅)): 
 
CWC ∆−≥∆≥∆− qpqp '' 10 , (6) 
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 Interestingly, one might think of (p(t),λ(t)) as a dynamic system for which -Π(p(t)) results in a Liapunov function and 
(p*,0) is a globally stable equilibrium. 
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where ∆q = q(p1) - q(p0), ∆C = C(q(p1)) – C(q(p0)) and ∆W = W(p1) – W(p0).10 Basically, (6) says 
that the price systems p0 and p1 provide useful information to assess the welfare effect of the change 
∆q. In our setting, i.e. with p0 = p*ι and p1 = p*, (6) specializes to the linear (with respect to ∆q) 
expression: 
 qcpqc )'()'( ** −≥∆≥− Wp , (7) 
which immediately says, as Varian (1985: p. 872) noted, that if marginal cost is the same across 
markets (i.e., c = cι) an increase in total output (ι’∆q > 0) is a necessary condition for welfare to 
increase following a change from uniform pricing (notice that this does not depend on p* and p* 
being chosen by a maximizing monopolist). This result, already established by Schmalensee (1981) 
a few years earlier, confirmed a conjecture that dates back to the seminal works of Arthur C. Pigou 
(1920: chapter 16) and Joan Robinson (1933: chapter 13).11 
In fact, it is easy to see that, if total output does not change, the change in welfare can be 
written ∆W = v + ∆Pp - ∆C, where ∆Pp = q(p*)’(p* - p*ι) = q(p*)’p is the relevant Paasche price 
variation for the representative consumer, and - v = v(p*ι) – v(p*) is the relevant Hicksian 
equivalent variation (see Bertoletti, 2002). And it is a well-known result of consumer theory (see 
e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: chapter 7) that the former variation is never larger than the latter 
(unless in the very special case of zero substitution effects, in which case they are equal). Thus, to 
avoid a welfare decrease following price differentiation (which causes a decrease in (gross) 
consumer surplus if total output does not change), we need a (strict) decrease in total cost. Notice 
that this result is due to the underlying preferences (and to the use of linear prices), and does not 
depend on the cost structure. 
Following Schmalensee (1981: p. 244), by using (5) it is also easy to see that the change in 
total output, Q(p(t)) = Σiqi(pi(t)), according to t is given by: 
 
.)('))((")])(())(('
))(([
2
1
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11
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tptpqctptptpq
dt
tdQ p
 (8) 
This shows that total output does not change (i.e., ι’∆q = 0) if the demand system is linear (qi” = 0, i 
= 1, ..., N), as Schmalensee (1981) noted for the case with a common unit cost. This result, that 
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 Notice that p0’∆q and p1’∆q are respectively the Laspeyres and Paasche quantity variations. 
11
 Varian (1985: p. 875) also showed that the result generalizes to the case of (common) increasing marginal costs, and 
Schwartz (1990) proved that it applies to the case of (common) decreasing marginal costs as well. 
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again goes back to Pigou and Robinson, generalizes to the case of interdependent demands, and 
even to the case of common variable marginal costs: see Appendix A. Notice that the second term in 
the last expression of (8) can be signed according to the concavity of demand: i.e., it is positive if 
and only if demand of market i is strictly convex (qi” > 0). 
 
III. The case of equal elasticities 
The two results concerning total output illustrated in the previous section are at the basis of 
the skeptical view of monopolistic differentiated pricing that we mentioned in section I. That view 
is rather widespread in spite of being in striking contrast with the related literature on price 
regulation, which tends to suggest that to allow a monopolist some price flexibility is welfare 
enhancing: see e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (1991) and Vickers (1997). In fact, we believe that a 
negative assessment of price differentiation is generally unwarranted, because the welfare criterion 
based on total output generally fails. Consider the following illustrative examples. Suppose that 
demands have the same elasticity at the uniform price p*, i.e., consider a case somehow “dual” with 
respect to the standard setting. Admittedly, as it turns out, this is a favorable situation for allowing 
price differentiation, but it should be borne in mind that it would be difficult to defend the use of 
uniform pricing if demand were very different. Moreover, intuition (and results below) suggests that 
the real point is the correlation across markets among the demand and the cost differences: why 
should we think of any specific correlation in the general case? Accordingly, we start with the no-
correlation simplest case. 
First, also suppose that demands are linear. Then it must be the case that the imposition of 
uniform pricing does not change total output. In the 2-goods case the situation is depicted in Figure 
1, where ∆Q = 0 indicates the locus of prices which corresponds to the same total output Q(p*ι), and 
V = v(p*ι) is the relevant consumer surplus indifference curve. The vector q(p*ι) is orthogonal to the 
plane ∆Q = 0 due to the assumption of equal demand elasticities. In fact, the no total-output change 
condition can be written: - Σi(qi(p*)εi(p*)/p*)dpi = 0, where εi(pi) = - qi’(pi)pi/qi(pi) is the demand 
elasticity in market i. Notice that any differentiated price vector actually chosen by a profit-
maximizing monopolist would increase consumer surplus, and thus social welfare by a trivial 
“revealed preference” result. 
The previous argument depends on another well-known result of consumer theory (again see 
e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: chapter 7): i.e., that the Laspeyres price variation ∆Lp = 
q(p*ι)’(p* - p*ι) = q(p*ι)’p is never larger than the Hicksian equivalent variation (the price locus 
∆Lp = 0 just describes the hyperplane tangent to V = v(p*ι) at p*ι). Thus, a nonpositive Laspeyres 
 9 
price variation is a sufficient condition for a consumer surplus (and then welfare) increase. In our 
example of equal elasticities and linear demands, the Laspeyres price variation from uniform 
pricing is given by Σiqi(p*)(pi* - p*) = - p*ε(p*)-1Σiqi’(p*)pi (where ε(p*) is the common value of the 
demand elasticity), which is nonpositive if: 
 0)('
11
* ≥==
==
Qqppq
N
i
i
N
i
ii , (9) 
where Q = Q(p*) - Q(p*ι). 
Now suppose that demands are (strictly) concave: in that case, depicted by Figure 2, the 
constant total output locus will have a concave graph. In this situation (concave demands with equal 
elasticities at p*ι) any price differentiation by the monopolist that does not decrease total output 
would clearly realize a sufficient condition for a welfare improvement. Formally, in (9): qi’(p*)pi ≥ 
qi. Indeed, note that, if demands are concave, p*ι minimizes v(p) over the set {p Q(p) ≥ Q(p*ι)}. 
This property of the uniform pricing (which does not depend on the cost structure) might come as a 
surprise, but it is just due to the familiar substitution effect. Suppose that, starting from uniform 
pricing, prices are differentiated just in such a way that to an increase dqi > 0 in a market i there 
corresponds a decrease dqj = - dqi < 0 in another market j. The first-order impact on the 
representative consumer’s utility due to this changes is given by dV = - qi(p)dpi - qj(p)dpj = 
p(dqi/εi(p) + dqj/εj(p)) = pdqi(1/εi(p) - 1/εj(p)), where p is the uniform price. The previous 
expression is of course null if demand elasticities are equal at the uniform price, but the overall 
impact will be positive because consumers trade the monopolist’s commodities off against the other 
goods (in our quasi-linear preferences setting, substituting them with and for the numeraire). That 
is, in the case of both markets the first-order term overstates the true impact on consumer surplus 
(this is just a verbal restatement of the convexity of v(⋅)). Notice that the first-order impact of a price 
change on the consumer surplus depends on the demand elasticity and the related quantity change. 
Finally, suppose that demands are isoelastic, i.e., qi(pi) = ipki ε− , with ki > 0 and εi > 1. It is 
easy to see that, under the assumption of equal demand elasticities (εi = ε, i = 1, ..., N), ∆Lp = 0: see 
Appendix B. Accordingly, in such a case monopolistic price differentiation increases total output, 
welfare and aggregate consumer surplus. More generally, even in the case of (possibly strictly) 
convex demand functions, a welfare improvement is achieved if the price change from the uniform 
price structure is “small” and output does not decrease. To see it formally, consider the change in 
welfare associated with t < t: 
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The first term in the square bracket in (10) reflects the change in profit in market i and is always 
positive, while the second is the correspondent change in consumer surplus, which is positive only 
if i ∈ W. Since for large enough t it will be pi(t) > ci for all i,12 the second expression in (10) makes 
it clear that in general it is not possible to sign the overall welfare impact of the increase in t 
between 0 and t. But note that welfare is increasing at t if, geometrically, the projection of 
dq(p(t))/dt on (p(t) - c) points in the same direction as the latter vector (i.e., if the inner product (p(t) 
- c)’dq(p(t))/dt is positive). Since the monopolist will choose the price change dp(t)/dt which 
achieves the maximum (available) value for (c(t) - c)’dq(p(t))/dt, this may point towards a “wrong” 
direction only if (p(t) - c(t))’dq(p(t))/dt = -Σiqi(pi(t))pi’(t) < 0. That is, only if price rises are 
associated with the largest demands (so that consumer surplus decreases). 
The third expression in (10) is just a continuous version of (7). It implies:13 
 
=
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N
i
ii
i dt
pdq
c
dt
dQp 
dt
dW
1
* ))0(())0(())0(( pp
, (11) 
which means that a piecemeal policy allowing the introduction of (small) price differentiation 
would cause a welfare improvement by reducing the average total cost if it does not also reduce 
total output, except in the “perverse” case in which quantity rises are on average associated with 
large marginal costs. Notice that ci(0) = p*/mi(p*), where mi(pi) = εi(pi)/(εi(pi) – 1) is the 
monopolistic mark up in market i. Thus, if demands have the same elasticity, in spite of their 
possibly being convex, dq(p(0))/dt and (p(0) - c(0)) = (p* - c(0))ι (where ci(0) = c(0), i = 1, ..., N) 
are at worst orthogonal if dQ(p(0))/dt ≥ 0. In particular, in such a case, by using: 
 )())(()()))(((
1
t
dt
tpdq
tc 
dt
tdC N
i
ii
i λ−=
=
pq
, (12) 
and λ(0) = 1, we get: 
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 Note that (pi(t) - ci) may even be negative in some markets for some t, but in such a case the correspondent element of 
the welfare change would certainly be positive. 
13
 Notice that dW(p(0))/dt = 0 if the demand system is linear and marginal cost is the same across markets. 
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. (13) 
Thus, if demands have the same elasticity, a profit-maximizing monopolistic “piecemeal policy” of 
price differentiation would indeed generally (whatever the concavity of demand) be welfare 
improving if it does not decreases total output. Notice that the first term on the right-hand side of 
(13) is just dv(p(t))/dt, which says that, for a small price differentiation, (aggregate) consumer 
surplus increases if and only if total output increases. 
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that, under the stronger assumption of equal demands, total 
output increases only if demand is strictly convex. In fact, by evaluating (8) at t = 0, it follows that, 
in the case of equal demands: 
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(14) says that, if demands are equal across markets, when allowing a small amount of price 
differentiation total output decreases if demand is strictly concave (q” < 0) and increases if demand 
is strictly convex.14 In turn, (14) implies that: 
 )(")()('2
)('2))0((
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2*
pqpqpq
pq
dt
dW
−
=
p
, (15) 
which says that, if demands are equal across markets, a piecemeal policy introducing small price 
differentiation always increases welfare in our setting (see footnote 14). Of course, if marginal costs 
are all equal as well, as in the standard set up, the unregulated monopolist adopts p* = p*ι, and the 
removal of the uniform pricing constraint has neither a positive nor negative effect.  
We summarize our results in the following Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1. 
I. If under uniform pricing the demand elasticities are equal across markets, 
monopolistic price differentiation does increase both welfare and aggregate 
consumer surplus: 
1) if demands are linear; 
2) if demands are isoelastic; 
                                                
14
 This is true under demand convexity if 2ε(p*) < η(p*), where η(p*) = - p*q”(p*))/q’(p*), but such a condition must be 
satisfied if the profit function has to be concave. Notice that the previous condition is always satisfied if demands are 
isoelastic. 
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3) if demands are concave and total output does not decrease. 
II. If only small price differentiations (a so-called piecemeal policy) are 
allowed to the monopolist: 
4) welfare always increases under equal demands (if demand is 
strictly convex total output increases, raising consumer surplus 
as well); 
5) welfare and (weakly) consumer surplus increase if total output 
does not decrease under equal demand elasticities. 
In fact, a profit-maximizing monopolist freed by the uniform pricing constraint should be willing to 
use this freedom to decreases the average unit cost, even when leaving total output unchanged (as 
happens in the benchmark linear case). And this could then be welfare improving, as suggested by 
(7) in the case of discrete price variations. However, if elasticities at the uniform price are different, 
he might be willing to increase prices in markets which are more costly to serve (if demand 
elasticities are positively correlated to marginal cost), and the directions of cost and output 
variations become difficult to establish even for a small price differentiation. Moreover, consumer 
surplus might decrease more rapidly than profit increases, thus reducing total welfare. This tends to 
happen if prices rise in markets where quantities are larger, which may well be the case since in 
those markets the demand elasticities tend to be smaller. Will in fact some of the previous results 
apply to the general case of unequal demand functions? 
 
IV. The linear case 
Following Varian (1985: pp. 873-4), we can notice that, by (1), the right-hand side of (7) can 
be written: Σici∆qi/(εi(pi*) – 1), where qi = qi(pi*) - qi(p*) (note that, if ci/(εi(pi*) – 1) = (pi* - ci) = ρ, 
i = 1, ..., N, then a weak increase in total output is sufficient for monopolistic price differentiation to 
produce a welfare improvement). Moreover, for concave demand functions, a sufficient condition 
for the right-hand side of (7) being non negative is that the Paasche price variation ∆Pp is non 
positive.15 However, while they have different information requirements (the latter being 
considerably less demanding, since it does not involve unit costs), Σici∆qi/(εi(pi*) – 1) ≥ 0 and ∆Pp ≤ 
0 are equivalent, sufficient conditions for a welfare improvement under monopolistic pricing if the 
demand system is linear. We also know from the discussion in section II that, under linear demands, 
a necessary condition for avoiding a welfare decrease due to price differentiation is that total cost 
                                                
15
 Notice that this does not guarantee that consumer surplus does not decrease: again see e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980: chapter 7). 
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does decrease. In fact, in the case of a linear demand system the welfare bounds in (7) become: -∆C 
≥ ∆W ≥ -∆Pp.16 
Since ∆Lp ≤ 0 is always a sufficient condition for a consumer surplus (and then a welfare) 
improvement, it thus turns out that under linear demands we can simply replace the invalid output 
criterion by checking the sign of the price variations ∆Lp and ∆Pp. Negative value for those 
variations are indeed sufficient conditions respectively for a consumer surplus or just for a welfare 
improvement. Note that these conditions are valid also for the case of strictly concave demands, and 
that their verification does not require cost knowledge.17 Of course, in principle one can also 
directly compute the welfare variations, but in general it is difficult to draw unambiguous 
conclusions (we present some relevant statistics in Appendix C). Notice that it is easily obtained 
that p* = (Cov{ci,bi} + a + bc)/(2b) and pi* = (ai + bici)/(2bi), where qi(pi) = ai - bipi (ai,bi > 0, ai/bi > 
ci, i = 1, ..., N), Cov{ci,bi} = (Σicibi)/N – cb is the covariance between ci and bi across markets, and a 
= (Σiai)/N, b = (Σibi)/N and c = (Σici)/N are respectively the average value of ai, bi and ci. Also notice 
that the previous expressions imply that the average value of -bi∆pi = ∆qi is null, as we already 
knew. Finally, note that (pi* - ci) = ai/(2bi) - ci/2. 
The simplest (unambiguous) case arises if ai/bi is the same across markets (notice that this 
restricts demand variability only at a single point, perhaps very far from the quantity-price couples 
observed in the market).18 In that case (pi* - pj*) = (ci - cj)/2 and thus the only reason for 
monopolistic price differentiation is to reflect the marginal cost differences (in the standard setting 
with a marginal cost common across markets, one gets p* = pi* and allowing price differentiation 
has no effect at all).19 In our setting, one should then expect that relaxing the constraint of uniform 
pricing would increase welfare. Indeed, allowing the monopolist price flexibility once again 
increases both welfare and consumers surplus. To see why, consider that in the linear case: 
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W , (16) 
where ∆Π = Π(p*) - Π(p*ι), and then: 
                                                
16
 There seems to be a misprint in Varian (1985: p. 875) concerning the expression of the welfare change when the 
demand system is linear. 
17
 It is worth noting that the actual computation of these price variations is common practice in the industries regulated 
by price caps: see e.g. Armstrong and Vickers (1991). 
18
 The vertical intercept parameter of a linear demand function is sometimes identified with the “reservation price” 
(willingness to pay) of the “richest” consumer: see for example Tirole (1988: pp. 143-4). But in our setting the 
assumption of quasi-linear preferences and no income effect does preclude such an interpretation. 
19
 Notice that this is nevertheless a case of price discrimination according to the Stigler’s broad definition we quoted in 
section I. 
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Thus, the condition Σi(ai/bi - ci)∆qi > 0 is sufficient for a welfare improvement and necessary for a 
consumer surplus improvement. Moreover, that condition is equivalent to ∆C < 0 if ai/bi = κ, i = 1, 
..., N: i.e., if all demands have the same vertical intercept, a decrease in total cost is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a welfare improvement. In such a case (see Appendix C for details): 
 
v
N
b
bNb
bcN
W
N
i
iN
i i
ii 3]
c
1)([
8
3
2
1
i
1
2
=












−=

 =
=
, (18) 
which, since the function g(x,y) = x2/y is convex on 2+ℜ , is necessarily non negative by the Jensen’s 
inequality (notice that the right-hand side of (18) becomes (3bN/8)Var{ci} if the demand functions 
are just equal across markets). 
To fully grasp the previous result, consider the case of a piecemeal policy of price 
differentiation with linear, possibly different, demands. We already know that total output does not 
change along the path from 0 to t (see (8)), which implies that Σibipi’(t) = 0. Moreover, (4) implies 
that ci(t) = 2pi(t) – ai/bi: accordingly, marginal revenues (demand elasticities) are equal at t = 0, i.e., 
ci(0) = c(0), i = 1, ..., N, if all demands have the same vertical intercept. We can immediately 
deduce from our analysis in section II that in such a case welfare increases and consumer surplus 
does not change following the introduction of small price differentiation. Note that, more generally, 
we get from (11) and (12): 
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which says that a necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare improvement is a negative 
correlation between ci and dqi(pi(0))/dt, while a positive correlation between ai/bi (and thus ci(0)) 
and dqi(pi(0))/dt would be necessary and sufficient for a consumer surplus improvement. Note that 
while the former condition appears quite natural, the latter seems to require some form of 
correlation between the demand parameters. Moreover, what happens if marginal cost is the same 
across markets is that the increase in profit is exactly matched by the decrease in consumer surplus, 
so that there is no welfare change (in the case of a piecemeal policy). If, on the contrary, ai/bi is the 
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same across markets, then there is no consumer surplus change and the increase in welfare is just 
due to cost reduction.  
Figure 3 illustrates the situation with equal marginal costs for the 2-markets case. Without 
loss of generality, the price in the strong market is indicated on the horizontal axis. Points u, d, f 
indicate respectively the position of uniform pricing, unconstrained monopolistic pricing and the 
first best. We show three iso-profit loci (surrounding d) indicated by Π, and three iso-welfare loci 
(surrounding f) indicated by W. The portion ud of the plane ∆Q = 0 is the locus of the p(t) price 
vectors.20 The line fd is instead the locus of the Ramsey price vectors (tangency points between the 
iso-profit and iso-welfare curves). Notice that at u the relevant iso-welfare curve is tangent to the 
∆Q = 0 plane (since the slope of the former is given by [- bs(ps - cs)]/[bw(pw – cw)]): accordingly, u 
dominates any other point of that locus with respect to social welfare (since as/bs > aw/bw, it is the 
case that at u the plane ∆Q = 0 is steeper than the relevant representative consumer indifference 
curve (not shown for the sake of simplicity), whose slope is given by – qs(ps)/qw(pw)). Figure 4 
illustrates instead the situation with equal demand elasticities at p* (as/bs = aw/bw). We show three 
iso-welfare loci and, for simplicity, a single iso-profit locus. Notice that the ∆Q = 0 plane is steeper 
than the relevant welfare locus at u, while they are tangent at σ (thus ps – pw = cs - cw at that point).21 
Since ps* - pw* = (cs - cw)/2, it must be that point d lies between u and σ. Accordingly, it necessarily 
welfare-dominates u. 
Note that a very special case arises if ai/bi - ci = 2ρ, i = 1, ..., N. In such a case (16) and (17) 
imply that ∆W = ∆pi/2 = - ∆v > 0, and of course ∆C < 0, unless there is no market variability at all 
and p* = p*ι (notice that (19) implies dC(q(p(0))/dt = - ½ = dv(p(0)/dt = - dW(p(0)/dt). The reason is 
simple: in this case the Ramsey price vector p* satisfies the second-best conditions (pi* - ci) = ρ, i = 
1, ..., N, we mentioned in section I, and thus p* maximizes W(p) over the set {p Q(p) = Q(p*ι)}. 
But, at the same time, p* minimizes v(p) over the previous set, since it equalizes qi/qi’ across 
markets. The situation is illustrated in Figure 5 for the two-markets case (notice that points d and σ 
coincide). These results neatly illustrate the potential conflict between welfare versus consumer 
surplus concerns in our second-best setting. However, they require a good deal of cross demand and 
cost parameter correlation, which in general is hardly plausible. 
Two other cases can be analyzed in more depth. Suppose that ai = a, i = 1, ..., N: i.e., all 
demands have the same horizontal intercept. In such a case we get: 
                                                
20
 Notice that ud is the locus of tangencies of the relevant iso-profit curves with 45° lines of the form ps - pw = T (this 
follows from (3)). 
21
 Also notice that in Figure 3 point σ would coincide with u. 
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Thus, a non positive covariance of demand slope and marginal cost would be sufficient to get a cost 
decrease by price differentiation (if all demands have the same horizontal intercept but marginal 
costs differ). Notice that a negative covariance means that at p* (at t = 0) higher marginal costs tend 
to be associated with smaller marginal revenues, so that average total cost should indeed be 
expected to decrease under price discrimination. The problem is that, under a negative covariance, 
price rises would also be associated with larger demands, so harming the representative consumer 
(as is suggested by (17) and (19)). Actually, this is the way monopolistic price discrimination 
operates if marginal costs are equal across markets. In fact, even assuming no cross correlation 
between cost and demand parameters (why should there be any in the general case?), the sign of the 
welfare (and also of the consumer surplus) change stays ambiguous (see (C6) in Appendix C). 
Clearly, in the two-markets case, a necessary condition for price differentiation to cause a welfare 
increase is that cs > cw (market i is strong if and only if ai/bi – aj/bj > cj - ci, i ≠ j, i,j = 1,2). It is easy 
to see that a sufficient condition for a welfare improvement is then cs – cw > as/bs – aw/bw; i.e., (cs – 
cw)/a > 1/bs –1/bw, if the horizontal intercept is common across markets (things are in such a case 
very much as in Figure 4). Indeed, as/bs < aw/bw (i.e., bw < bs in the case of a common demand 
horizontal intercept) is a sufficient condition for monopolistic price differentiation to deliver even 
an aggregate consumer surplus increase (in fact, in such a case the no-total-output-change locus is 
steeper than the relevant representative consumer indifference curve at u). However, Figure 6 shows 
a “perverse” case in which cs < cw and (any degree of) monopolistic price differentiation decreases 
social welfare with respect to the case of uniform pricing (notice that, in such a case, necessarily 
as/bs > aw/bw and thus price differentiation decreases aggregate consumer surplus).22 
Now suppose that bi = b, i = 1, ..., N: in such a case: 
 { } { }],[
2 iii
carVbcaCovNC +−= ,
 (21) 
                                                
22
 Notice that Figures 4 and 6 can be thought of as the results of “perturbations” of the market fundamentals (the 
demand and cost parameters) with respect to the case of demand (elasticity) and marginal cost equal across markets. In 
the latter case the iso-profit loci would be centered on the uniform price, points u, d and σ would coincide (at that point 
the relevant indifference curve of the representative consumer would be tangent to the plane ∆Q = 0, as in Figure 1) and 
of course the uniform pricing rule would have no hold. 
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where Cov{ai,ci} = (Σiaici)/N – a b is the covariance between ai and ci across markets. Notice that a 
nonnegative covariance of demand intercept and marginal cost is a sufficient condition to get a cost 
decrease (if all demands have the same slope and costs differ). Indeed, in this case a positive 
covariance means that at p* higher marginal costs tend to be associated to smaller marginal revenue, 
so that, once again, average total cost should be expected to decrease. But again a welfare 
improvement cannot be guaranteed, because even if ai and ci were uncorrelated, prices would rise in 
the markets with the largest intercept values, and this would have a negative first-order effect on 
consumer surplus. 
In fact, a simple computation shows that (see Appendix C for details) that, with equal demand 
slope: 
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and 
 
{ } { }]4[
8
 iii aVarbcaVarb
N
v −−= . (23) 
(22) and (23) confirm that a welfare improvement cannot be guaranteed, since it depends on the 
relative variability of ai and ci and on their correlation. In particular, notice in (22) that if the 
quantity demanded at the competitive equilibrium level is the same across markets, then ∆W 
achieves its maximum (positive) value. Of course this can only happen (with identical slope) if 
marginal costs are “perfectly” correlated with the intercept parameters (indeed, it requires ai = b(ci + 
2ρ), i = 1, ..., N: see above), and then ∆v gets its minimum (negative) value, as shown by (23). 
However, assuming Cov{ai,ci} = 0, it can also be shown that Var{ci} > Var{ai}/(3b2) becomes a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare improvement due to price differentiation, while 
Var{ci} > 3Var{ai}/b2 becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for a consumer surplus increase 
(see (C7) in Appendix C). It is easy to see that, in the two-markets case, if the slope is common 
across markets, cs – cw > (1/b)(as – aw) is a sufficient condition for price differentiation to cause a 
welfare increase (it must also be the case that cs – cw > (1/b)(aw – as): then things are once again 
very much as in Figure 4; in addition, if aw > as monopolistic price differentiation also raises 
aggregate consumer surplus). 
The main results of this section are summarized in Proposition 2. 
PROPOSITION 2. 
If demands are linear, monopolistic price differentiation: 
1) has ambiguous welfare effects in the general case, and a total 
output increase is not a necessary condition for a welfare 
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improvement: however, negative Laspeyres and Paasche price 
variations provide sufficient conditions respectively for an 
aggregate consumer surplus or just a welfare improvement; 
2) increases both consumer surplus and welfare if demands have 
the same vertical intercept; 
3) with a null cost and demand parameter covariance, it 
decreases total cost if demands have the same horizontal 
intercept or the same slope, and in the latter case also raises 
welfare (or even consumer surplus) if marginal cost variability 
is large enough with respect to demand variability. 
The lesson of Proposition 2 is that the traditional output criterion does not apply even to the linear 
demand system case unless one can be sure that marginal costs are equal. On the contrary, in such a 
case one can use the Paasche price index to check whether sufficient conditions for a welfare 
improvement are satisfied (this actually requires just demand concavity), or the Laspeyres price 
index to see if even an aggregate consumer surplus can be guaranteed (this more severe condition is 
indeed totally general). Moreover, information on the relative variability (and correlation) among 
demand and cost conditions appear crucial to judge the welfare impact of imposing monopolistic 
uniform pricing. It may even happen that the Ramsey pricing freely chosen by the profit-maximizing 
monopolist is the (second-best) welfare optimum. 
 
V. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have re-considered the case for imposing uniform pricing on a monopolist in 
a third-degree price discrimination setting with (possibly) differentiated marginal costs. As should 
be expected, we find that such an imposition has ambiguous welfare results. However, in the case of 
equal demand elasticities at the uniform price (a case somehow dual to the one traditionally 
considered by the literature), it tends to be socially better to allow some (perhaps mild) form of 
price differentiation (also an aggregate consumer surplus increase can be guaranteed if total output 
does not decrease). The main reason is that the price flexibility granted to the monopolist produces 
in such circumstances socially valuable average cost reductions. Moreover, from the social point of 
view there is nothing special in a uniform price (we have shown that it can be the “worst” pricing 
option), unless it is coupled with a common marginal cost. Similar results apply to the benchmark 
case of differentiated linear demands, if they have the same vertical intercept or, under null demand 
and cost parameter covariance (a seemingly reasonable assumption in general) and equal demand 
slope, if the variability of marginal cost is large enough with respect to demand variability. We 
conclude that the welfare criterion based on total output to allow price differentiation is very fragile. 
On the contrary, sufficient robust conditions for achieving a consumer surplus improvement, or just 
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a welfare increase (assuming demand concavity), can be checked by using the relevant 
(informatively undemanding) Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes. 
The previous results come as no surprise. Phlips (1981: p. 1) observed more than twenty years 
ago that, due to the presence of some market power: “generally, discriminatory prices will be 
required for an optimal allocation of resources in real life situation”. In fact, it is well known that in 
a second-best environment the imposition of an additional constraint may improve efficiency, but 
this is not always the case. It turns out that, even if output does not decrease, we cannot guarantee a 
welfare improvement by imposing a uniform pricing constraint on a monopolist, unless we are sure 
that the commodity is exactly the same. And apart from that case, the use of uniform pricing is just 
the addition of a further constraint to a second-best setting. The crucial element is then the 
assumption of a single commodity. Several authors noticed this difficulty (see e.g. Phlips, 1981: pp. 
5-9 and Varian, 1989: p. 599), and it should be clear that “similar” commodities are not the same 
commodity if they have different marginal costs. Moreover, by now many years of “new” 
regulation theory have taught us that we cannot assume that cost differences are easily disclosed, 
not to say incorporated in a regulation practice. Indeed, one message of the recent price regulation 
literature, from which this paper draws inspiration, stresses the (at least potential) social usefulness 
of allowing some price flexibility to a (regulated) monopolist (see e.g. Vickers, 1997). 
This does not mean that we disregard the contributions of the by now classic works by 
Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990), or, needless to say, of the original 
intuitions of Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933). In particular, we have used the model by 
Schmalensee (1981), and ideas and results of all the authors quoted above, to argue that, as a policy 
prescription, uniform pricing is not robust, even when corroborated by the requirement that total 
output should not increase by allowing price differentiation. Nowadays, it is widely accepted that 
possible social gains in the form of cost reductions should not be dismissed, and that the 
computation of well-defined Laspeyres or Paasche price indexes should replace the measurement of 
total output changes to serve consumer surplus or social welfare concerns (indeed, we owe these 
results to standard consumer theory, as first shown by Varian, 1985). 
It is also worth emphasizing that our results do not sustain a policy of complete monopolistic 
price behavior liberalization. On the one hand, we have just argued that imposing price uniformity 
on an otherwise unregulated monopolist is generally not a promising strategy. On the other hand, 
the monopolistic strategic (anti-competitive and anti-regulative) tactics are probably too complex to 
be described by a simple model, and we did not even attempted to do so here (thus our conclusions 
do not necessarily conflict with the rules of the Robinson-Patman Act). Nor have we considered the 
use of uniform pricing in “competitive” environments, a topic only very recently investigated by the 
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economic literature (see e.g. Stole, 2003, Galera, 2003 and Aguirre, 2004). In the latter case, in 
particular, it is for example well known that the European Authorities have reasons to endorse, to 
some extent, a policy of uniform pricing that relate to the making of the European common market 
and are not based on welfare considerations (even when they do not explicitly run counter to them: 
see e.g. Cabral, 2000: paragraph 10.5). And a similar comment would apply to the political 
constraints (mentioned in section I) based on “horizontal equity” concerns (even though the latter 
may be weakened by our result that price differentiation can also increase aggregate consumer 
surplus). 
Finally, we also stress that we have assumed throughout the paper that the monopolist 
possesses all the demand and cost information needed to maximize profit, very much as in the 
“Ramsey- Boiteux” tradition (also see Schwartz, 1990: p. 1262). If this were not the case, it seems 
to us that it would be even more difficult to sustain the use of a uniform pricing constraint: why 
should the policymaker be assumed to know more than the monopolist? In particular, if the 
differentiated pricing structure just reflects the cost knowledge of the monopolist, who is unable to 
get reliable demand (elasticity) information (as in the case of the so-called “Allais doctrine”), it is 
hard to imagine any economically sound reasons to defend the use of a uniform price. 
 
Appendix A 
We wish to show that even if the demands are not independent (i.e., ∂qi/∂pj is possibly non zero for 
some i ≠ j, i,j =1, ..., N), relaxing the constraint of a uniform pricing does not change monopolistic 
total output if the demand system is linear and marginal costs are either constant or common. We 
will assume that the correspondent FOC conditions do characterize the solution of the relevant 
profit maximization programs. Equations (1) become: 
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and by adding up 
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i.e., by using linearity of the demand system  
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where qji = ∂qj/∂pi, i,j =1, ..., N. Similarly, (2) becomes: 
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i.e., 
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by linearity. Finally, notice that, since qji = qij,23 the left-hand side of (A3) and (A5) are identical 
functions with respect to Q if either marginal costs ∂C(q)/∂qj are constant or they are equal and only 
depend on total output Q. QED. 
 
Appendix B 
Assuming isoelastic demands, equations (1) become: 
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which imply pi* = (εici)/(εi - 1). Similarly, equation (2) becomes: 
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which implies, assuming εi = ε (i =1, ..., N), p* = (εCov{ci,ki}/k + εc)/(ε - 1), where Cov{ci,ki} = 
(Σiciki)/N – ck is the covariance between ci and ki across markets, and k = (Σiki)/N is the average 
value of ki. Since ∆pi = ε[ci - c - Cov{ci,ki}/k]/(ε - 1), it follows that: 
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 The symmetry property qji = qij follows from the quasi linearity of consumers’ preferences: also see Layson (1998). 
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Appendix C 
In the case of a linear demand system, direct computation shows that the following equalities hold: 
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Notice that the last term in the square bracket in (C2) (the third term in the square bracket in (C3))24 
is nonnegative by Jensen’s inequality. Also notice that, if the demand parameters are not correlated 
with the marginal costs (perhaps the interesting case), we get ∆C ≤ 0 and ∆Lp ≥ 0, while ∆Pp cannot 
be signed (the last term in the square bracket in (C1) and (C3) is then certainly non positive). And 
remember that, by a general property, -∆Pp ≥ ∆v ≥ -∆Lp. A little bit more can be said if demand 
parameters, in addition to not being correlated to marginal costs, are also uncorrelated between 
them. In particular, if (without demand functions and marginal costs being all equal) ai = a (i = 1, 
..., N), we get ∆C = (N/2)[bc2 – (Σibici2/N)] < 0, ∆Lp = (a2/2)[(Σi1/bi) – N/b] > 0 and ∆Pp = 
(N/4){a2[Σi(Nbi)-1 – 1/b] + bc2 – (Σibici2/N)}; while, if bi = b (i = 1, ..., N), we get ∆C = - 
(bN/2)Var{ci} < 0, ∆Lp = (N/(2b))Var{ai} > 0 and ∆Pp = (N/(4b))[Var{ai} - b2Var{ci}], which 
neatly illustrate the role of the relative variance of demand and cost parameters. Note that, in the 
latter case, b2Var{ci} > Var{ai} is a sufficient condition for price differentiation to deliver a welfare 
improvement. 
Moreover, if (without assuming away any cross demand and cost parameter correlation) ai/bi 
is the same across markets, then we get ∆Pp = ∆C/2 = (N/(4b))[(Σibici/N)2 – b(Σibici2/N)] ≤ 0 and 
∆Lp = 0, which implies that consumer surplus (and thus welfare) increases if the monopolist actually 
differentiates prices (i.e., if marginal costs are different). In the special case in which the demand 
functions are equal (i.e., ai = a and bi = b, i = 1, ..., N: see section III) it turns out that ∆C = - 
(bN/2)Var{ci} = 2∆Pp ≤ 0: notice that this means that half of the cost decrease is “passed” to the 
representative consumer in the form of a revenue reduction. Also notice that, if ci = c, i = 1, ..., N 
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(the standard set up in the literature), ∆C = 0 (and thus welfare decreases if the monopolist does 
differentiate prices), and ∆Pp = ∆Lp/2 = 1/4[(Σiai2/bi) – N(a2/b)] ≥ 0. 
In addition, one can compute that: 
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(C4) 
and, finally: 
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 (C5) 
Notice that the first terms in the square brackets of the last expressions in (C4) and (C5) are 
nonpositive, while the last terms are nonnegative. Also note that, as anticipated above, if ai/bi is the 
same across markets, allowing monopolistic price differentiation delivers a consumer surplus and 
welfare improvement: ∆W = (3N/8)[Σi(cibi)2/Nbi) - (1/b)(Σi(cibi)/N)2] = 3∆v = 3/2 ∆Π ≥ 0 (∆W = 
(3bN/8)Var{ci} if demand functions are just equal across markets: see section III). If, on the 
contrary, marginal costs are equal across markets, monopolistic price differentiation 
(discrimination) causes a welfare decrease, as is well known: ∆W = (N/8)[(a2/b) - Σi(ai2/Nbi)] = ∆v/3 
= -∆Π/2 ≤ 0.  
More generally, however, even with a null cross demand and cost parameter correlation, (C4) 
and (C5) have ambiguous signs. In particular, in such a case they reduce to: 
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and 
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respectively if ai = a or bi = b (i = 1, ..., N). Note that, in the latter case, (C7) says that Var{ci} > 
Var{ai}/(3b2) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare improvement due to price 
differentiation, while Var{ci} > 3Var{ai}/b2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for a consumer 
surplus increase. 
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Figure 1: Uniform pricing with linear demands, equal 
demand elasticites 
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Figure 3: Monopolistic Price differentiation with equal 
marginal costs 
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Figure 4: Monopolistic price differentiation with 
equal demand elasticities at p* 
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Figure 5: Efficient (second-best) monopolistic 
price differentiation  
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Figure 6: Socially inefficient monopolistic price 
differentiation 
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